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iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The

Utah

Court

of Appeals

has

jurisdiction

in this

case

pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Should the Court uphold the trial court's ruling on the

motion

to

suppress, even

appear

for

the

hearing,

though
when

Defendant's
the

Defendant

counsel

failed to

through

counsel

submitted his position in writing which position failed as a matter
of law to provide a basis to suppress the evidence?
II.

Should

the Court

affirm

the trial

court's

denial of

Defendant's motion to suppress where the probation officer properly
entered a home where a probationer was residing and, after seeing
and smelling marijuana in the residence, obtained a search warrant
and,

based

on

the

search

authorized

by

the

warrant,

located

marijuana in the home?
III.

Was there probable cause supporting the warrant based on

the officers' smelling marijuana in the home and viewing in plain
sight a substance believed to be marijuana, and the probationer's
admission of drug use in the home?
IV.

Does the absence of the original search warrant in the

record negate the warrant, where it is undisputed that the trial
court issued the warrant?

1

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
"Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law that [the
Court] review[s] for correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177,
1185 (Utah 2004) .
"[The Court] review[s] . . . findings of fact supporting a
trial court's decision on a motion to suppress under a clearly
erroneous standard," State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), and "in assessing the trial court's legal conclusions
. . . afford[s] it no deference but appl[ies] a

'correction of

error' standard."7 State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (citation omitted).
For issues "not properly objected to" before the trial court,
the appellant must demonstrate plain error - that is, an "obvious"
error that "is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah
1993).
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend. IV. See Addendum A.
U.S. Const, amend. VI. See Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Proceedings Below
Defendant, Ronnie Curry, received a citation for possession of
a controlled substance and possession of paraphernalia on February
18, 2C04, R. 1. Defendant's counsel, Victor Gordon, filed a motion
to suppress

on

April

23, 2004,

2

setting

forth

the

Defendant's

alleged facts and argument. R. 19-23. Roosevelt City

(the City)

responded on May 5, 2004. R. 33-42. On July 27, 2004, the trial
court held a hearing to rule on the motion to suppress. Defendant
was present but his counsel did not appear. At the hearing on that
motion, the trial court stated that, "[the court was] prepared to
rule" based on the memoranda submitted by counsel. R. 121:9:18.
Following

a

brief

discussion,

the

court

ruled

based

on

the

arguments advanced by Defendant in his memorandum, finding those
arguments insufficient to sustain his motion to suppress and denied
the motion. R. 47-48; 121:9-13. The trial court then held several
status hearings trying to set a trial date. R. 52-53, R. 56-57, and
R. 63-64. On January 20, 2005, the court appointed

Defendant's

current counsel. R. 67-69. On March 31, 2005, Defendant entered
conditional pleas of guilty to the charges, reserving the right to
appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress. R. 89-90. The trial
court sentenced Defendant on August 18, 2005, staying the sentence
until the resolution of this appeal R. 122-125.
Facts
Rory Curry, the brother of Defendant Ronnie Curry, was on
probation with Adult Probation & Parole (AP &P). R. 33. Under the
probation agreement, Rory consented to visits at "[his] place of
residence, [his] employment, or elsewhere by officers of [AP & P]
for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of the
Probation Agreement." R. 33. On February 17th, Agent Shawn Lewis,

3

a probation officer, attempted to conduct a field visit at the
address that Rory had provided to AP&P. R. 34.
Agent Lewis, however, did not find him at the address. R. 34.
Officers from Roosevelt City, who accompanied agent Lewis, informed
him that Rory may have moved in with his brother, Defendant. R. 34.
This was a violation of Rory's probation agreement, R. 36, and
based upon that information, Agent Lewis, accompanied by Ammon
Manning,

of

the

Roosevelt

City

Police

Department,

Defendant's residence at approximately 10:15 p.m.

arrived

at

R. 34. Defendant

responded to the knock at the door, and swung the door wide open.
R. 34. Immediately upon Defendant's opening the door, Agent Lewis
stated that he was looking for Rory, and at the same time, Agent
Lewis saw Rory in the living room of the single-wide trailer home.
R. 34.
Agent Lewis requested
residence

that Rory speak with him about his

and problems with

his

compliance

with

the

terms of

probation. R. 34. Rory consented to speak with Agent Lewis. R. 34.
Agent Lewis asked Rory if he was living at the residence, to which
Rory replied affirmatively. R. 34. Agent Lewis then asked if they
could speak privately. R. 34. Rory led Agent Lewis to a bedroom
toward the back of the trailer. R. 34. While speaking with Rory in
the

bedroom,

Agent

Lewis

noticed

that

Rory's

eyes

were

very

bloodshot and watery and his pupils were dilated. R. 34. During
that conversation, Rory admitted that he had smoked marijuana at

4

that residence earlier in the day. R. 34. Agent Lewis also detected
the smell of raw marijuana in the room in which they were speaking.
R. 34. Agent Lewis did not conduct a search at that time, but
arrested Rory Curry for probation violations. R. 34.
Meanwhile, Officer Manning, who accompanied Agent Lewis into
the home, remained

in the living room with

Defendant

and his

sister, Rayma Curry. R. 34. While waiting for Agent Lewis, Officer
Manning observed a white paper plate on a countertop between the
living room and kitchen. R. 35. Atop the plate appeared to be
fragments of marijuana. R. 35. Based on Rory's admission of smoking
marijuana earlier in the day at the home, the odor of marijuana in
the bedroom, and Officer Manning's observation of the substance on
the paper plate, Officer Manning believed there was probable cause
to obtain a search warrant to inspect the home. R. 35.
Officer

Manning

went

to

obtain

the warrant,

while

Roosevelt City officers stayed at the residence with

other

Defendant

Rayma. R. 35. Defendant and Rayma were not in custody, or under
arrest, R. 35, but stayed in the home and watched television until
the warrant was secured. R. 35. Upon searching the residence, the
officers located marijuana and paraphernalia in the residence and
Defendant and Rayma were arrested for possession of a controlled
substance, and paraphernalia. R. 35.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of his counsel's
absence from the suppression hearing. Mr. Gordon submitted a motion
containing substantial factual and legal argument, and the City
responded. At the hearing, the trial court ruled based upon the
submissions

of

the

parties.

The

court

concluded

that

further

evidence or argument was unnecessary, and that the argument and
facts alleged by the Defendant were not sufficient to sustain a
motion to suppress and, therefore, denied the motion.
The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The
probation officers had a right to detain and talk to Rory Curry.
They were invited into the home and while in the home observed
facts providing probable cause to obtain a warrant.

The warrant

was obtained, and the search of the home after receipt of the
warrant resulted in the discovery of evidence of drug possession by
Defendant.
The absence of the original affidavit supporting the warrant
and the warrant in the file is not a basis for reversal.
items

are

missing

from

the

record,

the

Court

invokes

presumption that the proceedings below were in order.
ARGUMENT
I. THE HOLDING OF THE SUPPRESSION HEARING IN THE ABSENCE
OF DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT HARM DEFENDANT, AS THE TRIAL
COURT RULED ON THE SUBMISSIONS BY DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL
FINDING THEM INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE MOTION.

6

When
the

"As a general matter, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment
violation [of the right to counsel] must demonstrate *a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002).

"[T]here is an exception to this

general rule." Id.. " [The Supreme Court] ha[s] spared the defendant
the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome and ha[s]
simply presumed such effect, where the assistance of counsel has
been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding."
Id. ; see also Waastaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 776 (Utah Ct. App.
1990)

(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25

(1984)) (xxxThe Court

has

uniformly

found

constitutional

error

without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally
absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical
stage of the proceeding.'").
In

Woodward

v.

State,

the

couri

noted

the

policies

underpinning Cronic which inform its interpretation, observing:
In our evaluation . . . , we begin by recognizing that the
right to the effective assistance of counsel is
recognized not for its own sake, bui because of the
effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a

fair trial. Absent some effect
on the reliability
of the

of the challenged
conduct
trial
process,
the Sixth

Amendment guarantee is generally no: implicated

Thus,

we do

not

view

counsel's

performance

. . . .

in

the

abstract,
but rather the impact of counsel's performance
upon "what after all, is [the accused's], not counsel's
trial."
996 S.W.2d 925, 927

(Tex. App. Houston

7

;ist Dist.l

1999, pec.

ref'd,

cert,

denied,

529 U.S. 1092 2000) (quoting

Cronic, 466 U.S.

at 658, n.22) (emphasis added by Woodward Court).
That Court further stated "[W]e are not to judge the record in
particular

the abstract. Rather, we are to determine whether the
circumstance
that

involved here was 'so likely to prejudice' appellant

constitutional

original).

error

occurred."

id.

at

928

(emphasis

in

Accordingly, the court found that, "the reading back to

the jury of testimony

[during counsel's absence]

. . . was not

prejudicial to [the] appellant, and was not a 'critical stage' of
that proceeding." Id.
Other courts, have likewise applied a harmless error analysis
in the wake of Cronic. In People v. Carracedo, for instance, the
Court of Appeals of the State of New York, confronted with an
"overnight ban on consultation between defendant and his attorney
[which]

occurred

during

the

course

of

[a]

suppression

hearing," 89 N.Y.2d 1059, 1061 (1997), opined that it "[could] not
conclude that the pretrial violation

. . . was

'so serious that

[it] operate[d] to deny defendant's fundamental right to a fair
trial/

thereby

obviating

the

need

to

conduct

a

prejudice

analysis." .Id., at 1062 (emphasis in original) . In part relying upon
Carracedo,

another

deprivation

of

New

York

a defendant's

court,
right

to

"conclude[d]
counsel

at: a

that

the

pretrial

suppression hearing is subject to constitutional harmless error
analysis/' People v. Wardlaw, 794 :i.Y.S.2d 524, VI (N.Y. App. Div.

8

2005), Iv

granted

illustration
defendant

5 N.Y.3d 771 [2005]), noting "[a]s an obvious

of the principle,

was

improperly

. . . a situation

permitted

to

proceed

in which a
pro

se

but

nevertheless succeeded in obtaining suppression of the evidence in
question." Id.
The court in Wilson v. State, 764 So. 2d 813, 817 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000, cert, denied

534 U.S. 859 2001), reached a similar

result "hold[ing] that the in-court discussion in response to . .
. [a] jury's note . . . was in violation of Wilson's constitutional
right

to counsel/' Nevertheless, the court

absence

of

counsel

during

a

critical

structural defect automatically

referred

to

Satterwhite

stage

is

that

not

xx

[t]he

always

requiring a reviewing

bypass harmless error analysis." Id.
court

opined

a

court to

at 818. In explanation, the

v. Texas, 486 U.S.

249

(1988),

asserting that "the Supreme Court clarified in . . . [that case
that]

absence

or

deprivation

defendant

to an automatic

automatic

when

such

of

counsel

does

reversal; instead,

deprivation

of

counsel

not

entitle

reversal
Effected

a

is only
-

and

contaminated - the entire criminal proceeding.'" Wilson, 764 So. 2d
at 818 (quoting Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 257). Thus, the court did
not reverse when

xx

[t]he [trial] court did nothing that could have

influenced the jury's verdict; [and] there was no contact with the
jury that might have been altered by input from defense counsel."
Wilson, 764 So. 2d at 819.
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In'short, these courts consider harmless error either because
the stage is not considered critical or because, even if critical,
the lack of counsel did not "contaminate . . . the proceeding." Jd.
at 818 (quoting Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 257). In other words, the
analysis "turns on an assessment of the usefulness of counsel to
the accused at that particular proceeding." Woodward, 996 S.W.2d
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
In the case at hand, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's
absence, because the trial court was prepared to rule on and deny
the motion based upon the memorandum filed by Defendant. R. at
121:9:17-18.

The

trial

court, having

read

and considered

the

factual and legal contentions of the Defendant, denied the motion
without the need of testimony or argument. It is true that the
court allowed the City to proffer, R. at 121:9:17-18, but the
proffer

set forth essentially the same facts as in the City's

motion, and there is no indication that it had any effect on the
court's decision.
had an impact.

Accordingly, counsel's presence would not have
Therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by the

absence of counsel, and this Court need not disturb the trial
court's action.
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
WAS APPROPRIATE, AS THE OFFICERS ACTED LAWFULLY IN
SEEKING A PROBATIONER WHO WAS IN VIOLATION OF HIS
PROBATION AND A RESIDENT IN DEFENDANT'S HOME, AND IN
CONDUCTING A SEARCH PURSUANT TO A WARRANT.

10

The trial court concluded that the allegations of Defendant in
his

motion

(which

is

essentially

a

motion

combined

with

a

memorandum as it recites numerous factual allegations and cites
legal

authority

to

buttress

his

arguments)

did

not

warrant

suppression or further inquiry as the court announced an intention
to rule on the motions without further evidence or argument. R.
121:9:17-18. "The key," according to the court, "[wa]s that Rory
was on probation." R. 121:12:17-18.
Rory Curry, was residing with the Defendant.

Rory Curry was

at the residence and admitted he was residing there when confronted
by the probation

agent.

The terms of Rory Curry's

probation

allowed Agent Lewis to visit him anywhere, and having seen him in
plain sight through an open doorway, Agent Lewis could conduct a
visit with him about his probation. Rory's probation status makes
an enormous difference, because
probationers

Mo

XN

[i]t is abundantly

clear that

not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every

citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly
dependent on observance of special . . . restrictions.'" State v.
Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Griffin
v.

Wisconsin,

omitted).

436

868,

874

(1987))

(further

citations

Consequently, in the case of probationers, a search cf

-he probationer's
officer

U.S.

has

a

residence

reasonable

is

authorized

suspicion

that

if
the

"the

[probation]

probationer

has

committed a probation violation or crime, and [if] . . . the search

11

is reasonably related to the probation officer's duty.'" State v,
Davis, 965 P. 2d 525, 529

(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v.

Johnson,

1072

748

P.2d

1069,

(Utah

1987)).

XN>

[S]earches

have

generally been upheld where the p[robation] officer's suspicion is
based only on a tip by an anonymous informer, the police, or other
sources, '" Martinez, 811 P. 2d at 209, and the probation officer may
search the residence even if the probationer is absent. Id.
Moreover,
by accepting the terms of
probation, [a
probationer] consent [s] to searches of any areas of the
residence over which he [or she] ha[s] common authority
. . ., and . . . officers c[an] premise their search of
these
areas
on
reasonable
suspicion
that
[the
probationer] ha[s] violated a condition of his [or her]
probation. This [i]s a risk [a co-resident] assume [s] by
living with . . . a probationer.
Davis, 965 P.2d at 532.
In the instant circumstances, Agent Lewis had a reasonable
suspicion that Rory was violating his probation. Rory was not at
the address provided to Adult Probation and Parole, and Agent Lewis
received a tip from the police that Rory may have moved to the home
of Defendant. R. 34. He followed up on the tip and found that
indeed Rory Curry was residing at Defendant's home. R. 34.
Even if Agent Lewis had been mistaken about Rory residing in
the home, he was justified in entering the home based upon the
reasonable belief that it was Rory's residence. "It is settled that
where probation

officers

. . . are justified

in conducting a

warrantless search of a probationer's residence, they may search a
12

residence reasonably believed to be the probationer's." People v.
Palmguist, 123 Cal.App.3d 1, 11 (1981).
In

People

"information

v.

from

Kanos,
a

for

example,

confidential

the

informant

police

.

.

obtained

. that

[the]

defendant was again living at [an address]," 14 Cal.App.3d 642, 646
(1971),

and

"Special

Parole Agent Chris Brett

. . . received

information from the Los Angeles Police Department that a reliable
source had told them that [the] defendant would be at . . . [the
address]." .Id.. The "[d]efendant and his brother testified that . .
. [the] defendant had [in fact] lived continuously with his mother
at [another address] . . . ." Ld. at 647. Nonetheless, the court
found

that

defendant

"[t]he

search

of

the

was permissible," icl. at

apartment

as

648, because

that

of

"[t]he

[the]
agents

reasonably believed . . . [it] was [the] defendant's residence."
Id.1
Significantly, although the officers were entitled to search
the home they reasonably believed to be Rory's residence, they did
not proceed with a search until acquiring a warrant, R. at 35, and
officers properly waited with Defendant and his sister as Officer

I

Although Utah courts do not appear to have announced this rule
in such clear terms, in Martinez, the probation M[o]fficer . . .
went to an apartment located at 8070 West 3500 South, number 23,
where he believed Martinez lived," 811 P.2d at 207, although the
"probation agreement . . . listed [Martinez's] address as 8076 West
3500 South, #23," id. n.l, because NNhe had been to the apartment
complex before and found that the only apartment 23 was located at
8070 West, not 8076 West." id.
13

Manning went to secure the warrant. R. at 35. Indeed, the Supreme
Court, in Illinois v. McArthur, noted that "[the Court] ha[d] found
no case in which th[e] Court

. . . held unlawful

a temporary

seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to
prevent the loss of evidence while the police obtained a warrant in
a reasonable period of time." 531 U.S. 326, 334 (2001).
The officers acted appropriately, and the trial court had
ample reason to deny the motion to suppress.
III. THE ISSUE OF INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE SUPPORTING
THE WARRANT IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AS IT IS
FIRST RAISED ON APPEAL, AND, IN ANY CASE, THE WARRANT WAS
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE GLEANED FROM THE OFFICERS'
OWN SENSES AND THE WORDS OF THE PROBATIONER.
Defendant

challenges

the

probable

cause

supporting

the

warrant, and concedes that this issue was not raised before the
trial court. Br. of Appellant at 43. "[Mjatters not placed in issue
at trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." State v.
Jackson, 873 P.2d 1166, 1167 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
What is more, the warrant was supported by probable cause.
"'In

general,

contraband

or

probable
evidence

cause
of

means

a crime

a

fair

will

be

probability
found.'"

that

State

v.

Alvarez, 111 P.3d 808, 814 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (quoting State v.
Yoder, 935 P. 2d 534, 540

(Utah Ct. App. 1997)).

In the instant

case, the basis for the warrant was derived from the officers' own
experiences, not that of others. The officers' saw and smelled the
marijuana. Additionally,

Rory

admitted

14

using

marijuana

in the

residence earlier that day. Based on the these facts, there was
certainly " xa fair probability that contraband

..

.,.w[ould] be

found,'" id., and the judge properly issued the warrant.
To defeat this result, Defendant contends that the affidavit
supporting the warrant was misleading because Officer Manning did
not disclose that the officers were in the home "illegally,'' Br. of
Appellant at 42 (emphasis removed), and because "[it] misrepresents
that

the

alleged

field

visit

address." Br. of Appellant

was

to

the

probationer'

[sic]

at 40. Obviously, the officers, in

securing the warrant, did not state that they were in the home
illegally, because they were not.

Agent Lewis was entitled to

enter a residence reasonably believed to be Rory' s home due to
Rory's probation status, and, in any case, the officers entered to
speak with Rory only after observing him through an open doorway,
asking

to

speak

with

him

and

being

invited

in.

R.

at

34.

Additionally, although the officers believed it was Rory's address,
the affidavit does not affirmatively state such, but says only that
XN

th[e] affiant and Agent Shawn Lewis went to the residence to do a

field visit with Rory Curry." Aff. and Order for Search Warrant 1
5. Agent Lewis was entitled to attempt visits not only at Rory's
home, but at any location.

In sum, the affidavit was both truthful

and supported by probable cause.
IV. DEFENDANT DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE HOW COUNSEL'S ALLEGED
IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE INJURED DEFENDANT, WHICH DEFENDANT
MUST ESTABLISH TO PREVAIL ON HIS CLAIM.
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Defendant's fourth and fifth points are a repetition of the
first.
refer

Thus, the City would respectfully request that the Court
to

the prior

arguments.

To the

extent

that

Defendant

believes that Defendant's right to counsel was violated other than
at the suppression
counsel

was

hearing, it is not clear how his right to

denied

or

how

he

was

prejudiced.

After

all,

Defendant's own statement of the facts illustrates that Defendant
was represented by Victor Gordon up until the time that current
counsel was appointed, that the court repeatedly accommodated Mr.
Gordon, and, in any event, that nothing of consequence occurred
between the suppression hearing and Ms. Doherty's appointment as
counsel. Br. of Appellant at 23-25, 47-48. "An error by counsel,
even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside
the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error ha[s] no effect
on the judgment.'' Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 691
(1984). "Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance
must

be

prejudicial

to

the

defense

in

order

to

constitute

ineffective assistance under the Constitution." Ici. at 692.
V. THE LACK OF THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE WARRANT AND
THE WARRANT IN THE RECORD DOES NOT NULLIFY THOSE
DOCUMENTS, DUE TO THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISPOSITION IN THE FACE OF AN INCOMPLETE RECORD
AND BECAUSE THE WARRANT'S EXISTENCE IS NOT IN QUESTION.
Defendant's final argument is that the lack of the warrant in
the record "invalidates" it. Br. of Appellant at 48. As stated by
this Court in State v. Rawlinqs, however, "[i]n the absence of an
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adequate record on appeal, [the Court] cannot address the issues
raised and . . . presume [s] the correctness of the disposition made
by the trial court." 829 P.2d 150, 152-153 (1992).
Furthermore, under somewhat similar circumstances, in United
States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d

609, 614 n.8

(11th Cir.

1985),

"[t]he original warrant and supporting affidavit authorizing the
search of [the] appellant's residence . . . [were] not contained in
the record . . . ." "Apparently, these documents were lost prior to
the suppression hearing." Ld. Nevertheless, the court upheld the
warrant. IdL at 616. Likewise, in the case at hand, there is no
need to cast the warrant aside. There is no doubt that it existed.
Indeed,

the

trial

court

actually

issued

the

warrant.

R.

at

121:11:4-12.
CONCLUSION
For

the

respectfully

foregoing
requests

reasons,

that

Plaintiff,

Roosevelt

the Court affirm the trial

City,
court's

decision on Defendant's motion to suppress.
DATED this

Ly

day of April, 2006.
A1LRED & McCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDA
A.
B.

U.S. Const, amend. IV.
U.S. Const, amend. VI."

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense.
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